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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----;~iLt.N R.

COLLIER,

Petitioner,
Case No. 19379

',':;:,

FR'..D c. scm~ENDIMAN, CHIEF
Dnver License Services,
:1epartment of Public Safety
fn the State of Utah,

Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant's Utah driving privileges were revoked
cr1der Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-44.10 <1953) as amended in 1981,
"ecause he refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath
when requested to do so by a police officer.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

A hearing before the Department of Public Safety,
Jr1ver License Division, was held on May 9, 1983.

Appellant

petitioned the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
''

11

d for Uintah County, State of Utah, for review pursuant to

al: Coue Ann. § 41-6-44 .10 Cb).
·e 16,

After a trial de noyo on

19831 the Seventh Judicial District Court denied

'oedlant' s petition.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the decision of . -111dc
Richara C. Davidson of the Seventh Judicial District Court,
Uintah County, State of Utah.
The uncontroverted and undocumented facts are that on
April 12, 1983r appellant was arrested by Officer Lynn L.
Hooper of the vernal City Police Department for violation of
Utah Code Ann.

§

41-6-44, driving under the influence of

alcohol ("DUI").

Sergeant Laursen, also of the Vernal City

Police Department, assisted in the arrest.

Appellant was

admittedly intoxicated and was unable to perform simple field
sobriety tests.

Upon arrest, appellant was transported to the

Vernal City Police Department where Officer Hooper requested
that appellant submit to a breath test on an intoxilizer.
Appellant refused.

(Transcript and Appellant's Brief.)

Officer Hooper in his police report reported that
appellant was totally uncooperative and abusive during the
entire episode.

He used abusive language and threatened to

cause Orficer Hooper to lose his job by talking to various
higher authorities including Governor Matheson.

Appellant told

Officer Hooper that if Officer Hooper wrote any of this in his
report, appellant would deny it.
After appellant refused to submit to the breath test,
the implied consent statute, Utah Code Ann.
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§

41-6-44.10, was

·:-c!ai,,ed to him.

!.ga!f" he refused.
:iines.

He was again asked to submit to the test.
This process was repeated a number of

Appellant informed Officer Hooper "that he could go to

hdl..

Because there is no question that appellant was
intoxicatea and that he refused to submit to the test offered,
the cnly possible issue before this Court on appeal is whether
~he

test offered (but refused) satisfied the requirements of

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .10.

Respondent argues that in a

refusal fact situation, the type of test is not an issue but
also, obviously, that the intoxilizer test meets the intent of
the statute.

POINT I
APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE A BREATH TEST IS A
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10
The issue before Department of Safety Hearing Officer
C. Niels Nielson was simply whether appellant had refused a

ch 0 mica1 test offered to him pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-644.10.

The same issue was before the Seventh Judicial District

Co 0 rt.

Neither the Department nor the court erred in finding

that appellant had refused.

Appellant argues that no "chemical test" was offered,
'ecause an intoxilizer test for chemicals in the blood is not a
·

110

mica1 test.

This argument must fail regard! ess of whether
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or not an intoxilizer is technically a "chemical test."
Utah Code Ann.

§

41-6-44.10 <1953), as applicahle

Jt

the time or the arrest, provided in part:
(a) Any person operating a motor vehicle in this
state shall be deemed to have given his consent
to a chemical test or tests of his breath,
blood, or urine for the purpose of determining
whether he was driving or in actual physical
control ot a motor vehicle while under the
influence or alcohol, • • • A peace officer
shall determine which of the aforesaid tests
shall be administered.
No person, who has been requested pursuant to
this section to submit to a chemical test or
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have
the right to select the test or tests to be
administered. The failure or inability of a
peace orficer to arrange for any specific test
shall not be a defense to taking a test
requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in
any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to
the requested test or tests.
(bl If such person has been placed under
arrest and has thereafter been requested by a
peace otficer to submit to any one or more of
the chemical tests provided for in subsection
(a) of this section and refuses to submit to
such chemical test or tests, such person shall
be warned by a peace officer requesting the test
or tests that a refusal to submit to the test or
tests can result in revocation of his license to
operate a motor vehicle. • • •
From the record it is clear that appellant was
offered a breath test and refused.
what test was offered.

It is not clear, however,

Appellant admits that a breathalyzet,

as opposed to an intoxilizer, is a valid chemical test.
Officer Hooper's report states at one point that an intoxilize 1
test was offered.

At another point, his report identified the
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tee' ,-,rfered as a breathalyzer.
t~licit
:,f

Although the record is not

on this point, it is safe to assume from the testimony

this proceeding and the arguments of counsel that had

,ppellant submitted to a test, an intoxilizer test would have
teen given to him.

This fact, however, is irrelevant to the

oetetmination of whether a chemical test was offered to, and
refused by, appellant.

The inconsistency in Officer Hooper's report is most
likely due to 1 ack of language, rather than volition.

It is

'mlikely that Officer Hooper perceived a difference between the
, terms intoxilizer and breathalyzer.

The terms are used

s'1nonymously by most people.

Indeed, this court has not made a

distinction between the two.

For example, in Holman y. Cox,

i98 P.2d 1331

(Utah 1979), in dealing with a test refusal

issue, this court identified the test offered simply as a
"oreath test."

In Powell y. Cox, 608 P.2d 239 (Utah 1980),

chis court identified the test offered as a "breathalyzer"

test.

.ld.. at 23 9.

The language used does not matter since

appellant's witness testified that intoxilizers had been in use
it least as early as 1975.

(R. 20)

There is no difference between a "chemical test" and
i

test

01

the "chemicals in the blood"

intent of the statute.
lMenctea

the purpose and

An intoxilizer is a "chemical test"

by the statute anyway.

I.new the difference.

-s-

It is unlikely that appellant

There is absolutely nothing in the record to
support the view that appellant ref used because he reasonably
believed that no "chemical test" had been offered.
only transcribed one witness's testimony. CR. 20)

Appellant
Further,

appellant was simply offered "a breath test," and the court
found that appellant refused to submit to any test of any
.IU..nd.

The statute clearly states that "ltlhe failure or

inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific test
shall not be a defense • • • • • (Emphasis added.)

The Utah

implied consent statute clearly directs that a test "or tests"
is to be given at "the direction of a peace officer" who has
grounds to be1ieve and clearly directs that the peace officer
shall be the one to "determine which of the aforesaid tests
shall be aaministered.•

The legislature even went further and

added a paragraph stating that "no person who has been
requested under this section to submit to a chemical test or
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, shall have the right to
select the test or tests to be administered."

As well, the

legislature added that "the failure or inability of a peace
officer to arrange for any specific test is not a defense with
regard to taking a test requested by a peace officer • . . "
clearly showing a legislative intent that an individual could
not equivocate, stall or argue by attempting to specify what
type ot test may or may not be given. (Utah Code Ann.
44 .10 (l))

§

41-6-

The legislature clearly showed this kind of intent
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,,
1

d as this Court has stated, the statute should be

·.cristrued in a fashion to make its application practicable,
and to enable an officer to deal realistically with arrested
drivers who may be uncooperative, and even hostile."

Justice

, Stewart in Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1337 Cl979).
This legislative intent is still further exemplified
in subparagraph (2), where the legislature again states that
after a warning, unless the person immediately requests the
chemical test or tests "as offered by a peace officer be
administered, no test shall be given • • • " Utah Code Ann.
! 41-b-44.10(21

In addition, this Court clearly held in

Cavaness y, Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979), that the defense
of "reasonable refusal" is not available and a simple "yes" or
"no" answer is required.
Richara

c.

.l.d. at 352.

Therefore, Judge

Davidson was correct in ruling that the issue before

the court was whether or not appellant refused, and that
appellant had, in fact, refused.
i

Based on the Record this

Court can only affirm that holding.
POINT II
AN INTOXILIZER IS A CHEMICAL TEST WITHIN THE
LOGICAL MEANING OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10

Appellant alleges that because no chemical reaction
-~involved in the intoxilizer analysis,

(which by definition

nay not be true), the intoxilizer test is not a "chemical test"

~ithin the meaning of the statute.

This kind of narrow reading

01 ~e statute is illogical and contrary to the intent and
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purpose of the statute.

Other courts that have considered Lhls

question have uniformly rejected the argument that no chemical
test is involved simply because no chemical reaction takes
place.
The earliest decision on the subject came from the
Superior Court of Delaware in 1973.

In State y. Moore, 307

A.2d 548 (Del.Super. 1973), the court was faced with the
question of whether an intoxilizer test gave a "chemical
analysis" within the terms of a statute similar to the Utah
statute in question in this case.

(The Utah statutes do not

use the language "chemical analysis".) The court stated:

"The

defendant seems to contend that the phrase 'chemical analysis'
means an analysis made with chemicals.

However, I gather that

the phrase does not have so narrow a meaning." .l.d. at 549.
The court found that the phrase related to an examination of
the component parts of a chemical substance by any means and
logically concluded, "the test in question is a 'chemical
analysis' regardless or the fact that the procedure is purely
mechanical." .l.d.
In City of Dayton y. Schenck, 63 Ohio Misc. 14, 409
N.E.2d 284 (1980), the Municipal Court of Dayton, Ohio, was
facea with this same issue.

In finding the defendant's

definition of chemical test "far too narrow,• the court noted
that the scientific world accepts physical tests as reliable

-8-

,, the purpose ot chemical analysis.

Therefore, the court

nelci that "the phrase 'chemical analysis' is used quite
cnrnrnonly to include tests for identifying chemical compounds by
their physical properties, as the intoxilizer does.•

.l.d. at

16' 286.

A similar result was reached by the Oregon Court of
:,roeals in the case of State v. Dorsey, 58 Or.App. 521, 648
!

P.2d 1304 ( 1982).

Each or these cases were decided on statutes basically similar to the Utah statutes.

The "chemical analysis"

' language is found in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.

The "chemical

test" language is found in Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10.

The

statutes in the states involved in the above cases are similarly wordea.
in~
!

Compare, for example, the Oregon statutes involved
and in State v. Wardrip, 55 Or.App. 117, 637: P.2d

2i9 (1981), with the Utah statutes.

While most of the cases

have relied on the "chemical analysis" language, there is
a~olutely

no indication that the broader language, "chemical

test', would require a different result.

Indeed, all of the

courts seem to use the terms interchangeably.
In another recent case of People y. Jones, 118
'1isc.2a 687, 461 N.Y.S.2d 962 (Albany County Ct. 1983), the

l\Jbany County Court rested its decision directly on "chemical
test• language.

The case involved the question of whether the
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Intoximeter 3000, a highly sophisticated intoxilizer device,
was included in the statutory language, "chemical test," evp 11
though no chemical reaction was involved.

In a scholarly

discussion, the court noted the scientific principles upon
which the Intoximeter operates and also weighed the
professional acceptance and use of the machine.

In rejecting

the claim that the Intoximeter did not meet the terms of the
statute because no chemical "reaction" was involved, the court
stated:
The position advanced by defendant seeks to
restrict the meaning of "chemical test" to a
process more appropriately called a chemical
reaction. There is no authority in the law to
require defendant's interpretation. Furthermore, to adopt the defendant's position would be
to bind inflexibly the administration of justice
to the level of technology extant at the time of
the enactment of the statute while technological
advances thereafter would be unavailable to law
enforcement officials if they did not fall
within the terminology of a dated statute. If
such a result is not required, it ought not to
be adopted •

.Id. at 962.

The court, therefore, logically concluded that

the term "chemical test" was "intended to mean an analysis of
the chemistry of the substance therein referred to -- breath,
blood, urine or saliva -- to determine the subject's bloodalcohol content, and was not intended to refer to the method
of testing."

(Emphasis added.)
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This Court, if it reaches this issue, certainly
onoulCI adopt the sound reasoning of the Albany County Court.

;:,e intoxilizer in present use by trained law enforcement
,tticials subjects the chemicals of an air sample to a physical
test that determines the chemical composition of the air sample
and the blood.

This information can be used to accurately

calculate blood-alcohol levels.
~e

Therefore, although there may

testimony that no chemical reaction is involved, the

;ntoxilizer is a chemical test within the purpose and intent of
~tah

Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10.
The testimony of Dr. Kevin Mccloskey really does not

1equire a different result.

Dr. Mccloskey did not testify that

the intoxilizer is not a "chemical test." Instead, a careful
"ading or the testimony shows that he gave only an opinion
that no "cnemical reaction" is involved in an intoxilizer
analysis.

In attempting to explain how an intoxilizer

operates, Dr. Mccloskey answered as follows:
The basic scientific principle of the
functioning of the intoxilizer rests on a
phenomenon called •infrared spectrometry"
which, essentially, is taking advantage of a
property of chemical compound, of their
ability to absorb particular and specific
wavelengths ot light.
Essentially what the
machine does is once a substance is in the
chamber. it shines a specific freguency of light
through it that is then sensed. Or any
decrement. any reduction. in the intensity of
that freguency of light. then. is registered on
a sensing device and shows up electronically as
both a presence of a compoynd. and through some
Qther electronic apparatus the amount of that
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compound present. But it's dependent upon the
absorption qualities of the chemical molecules
and no chemical reaction takes place.
<Tr. 1011) (emphasis added>.
This opinion clearly indicates that the test is based upon an
analysis or the properties of a chemical compound.

Further,

Dr. Mccloskey testified during cross-examination that the
intoxilizer is accurate and is generally accepted by the
scientific community, (Tr. 15), which is a factor weighed by
all of the courts.

Therefore, appellant's own expert's opinion

cannot refute respondent's position that an intoxilizer is a
chemical test within the meaning of Utah Code Ann.

§

41-6-

44.10.
POINT III
THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED TO INCLUDE INTOXILIZERS WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THE TERM nCHEMICAL TEST OR TESTS"
IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.10.
Appellant alleges that the legislature must have
intended to exclude intoxilizers and other nphysical tests"
from the implied consent statute, Utah Code Ann.

§

41-6-44.10,

because intoxilizers were used in 1975, and repealed and reenacted the statute was enacted in 1981 and no mention of
physical tests appears in the statute.

This argument must fail

for a number of reasons.
The argument is based on the assumption that the
legislature was aware of the distinction appellant now assert 0
between the breathalyzer and the intoxilizer.
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As has already

;i•Jted. this assumption is highly unlikely.

The

,t'l;s:at-ive record contains no mention of either the
neathalyzer or intoxil izer.

Since both the breathalyzer and

:rie intoxilizer were in use prior to the 1981 enactment of the
otatute, it is at least as likely to assume that the
:egislature expected both would be treated similarly, as to
issurne that the legislature intended to include one, but
exclude the other.
More importantly, appellant's assumption that the
:egislature intended not to include intoxilizers because the
scatute was enacted in 1981 and intoxilizers were in use in
,975 (and for a number of years prior to that date)
1°.s~pportable

is

because it is based on insufficient data and not

oased on any testimony.
Utah Cooe Ann.

§

41-6-44.10 was first enacted in

1957, many yea rs prior to the invention of the intoxil izer.

The statute, as enacted in 1957, read in part as follows:
(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given his
consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood,
urine or saliva for the purpose of determining
the alcoholic content of his blood, • • • •
'17 Utah laws 188.
1S81 dnd 1983,

It was amended in 1959, 1967, 1969, 1977,

Most of the amendments dealt with minor

:ra.,1imatica1 or organizational corrections.

Also, the words

'Oliva and urine were deleted, and urine was subsequently

-13-

restored.

The consequences were changed.

However, the

•cnemicai test" language has remained unchanged since 19S;.
addition, the 1977 and 1981 versions of the statute are
identical in every respect.

In 1981, the statute was repealed

and reenacted in exactly the same form as a part of S.B. 74 of
1981, a comprehensive revision of the entire health code.

Therefore, any assumptions about what the legislature intended
by the "cnemical test" language must be based on facts known or
available to the legislature in 1957.

There is no evidence

that the legislature ever considered the interpretation of that
language at any subsequent date.
Further, because all of the cases that have
cons1dereo the question have decided an intoxilizer is a
chemical test, it is reasonable to assume the legislature
intendeo to include intoxilizers on each date the statute was
amended, because the legislature did not exclude intoxilizers
from the operation of the words chosen.
A basic rule ot statutory construction is that the
legislature was aware of the judicial interpretations of the
words used, and intended the judicially established meaning.
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975); In....Le
Marriage of Bouquet, 546 P.2d 1371 (Cal. 1976);

c. Forsrniill

Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 547 P.2d 1116 (Idaho 1976).

It H

therefore safe to assume the legislature did not intend to

-14-

f>.-"ide

1ntoxilizers from the statutory term "chemical test,"
where no affirmative evidence of such an intent can

,,cE·'iil ly

._, io;rnd.

In City of Dayton y, Schenck, 63 Ohio Misc. 14, 409

(Dayton Mun. Ct. 1980), a "chemical test" case, the

2J 284

u

,rt noted that dictionary meanings should not be controling.
:~stead,
1

"the touchstone of statutory interpretation is the

'e1islat•He' s purpose, not any supposed 'plain meaning' of the
.:rds it used." .IJ:l, at 16, 286.

1

11 tnxilizer

In rejecting a claim that an

is not a chemical test, the court stated:

:.ardly conceivable that the legislature intended . •
1'to

"[Ilt is
to allow

evidence the results of chemical analyses which employ

:reo1ca1 reactions but to exclude non-reaction physical tests
:~garded

as equally reliable by persons who do chemical

;calyses professionally every day."
statutory citation omitted).

.IJ:l. at 16, 286,

In the instant case, appellant's

:'.aim that the legislature intended to exclude intoxilizers

'

:ro~

the meaning or the term "chemical test" is equally as

;.1•.:oncei vabl e.
POINT IV
THE

SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR

IN DETERMINING THAT THE INTOXILIZER IS A "CHEMICAL TEST."

Appellant argues the lower court committed error by
'''1ny iudicial notice that the intoxilizer is a chemical test.

,,i,IJ~ it was argued at trial that it would be proper for the
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court to take judicial notice that the intoxilizer is a
chemical test within the meaning of the statute, there is

~0

evidence in the record that the district court took judicial
notice of this fact.

In fact, the court below did not even

decide the issue ot whether an intoxilizer is a chemical test,
but chose to rest its decision on the broad language of the
statute which says "the failure or inability of a peace officer
to arrange for any specific test shall not be a defense to
taking a test requested by a peace officer nor be a defense in
any criminal, civil or administrative proceeding resulting from
a

p~rson's

refusal to submit to the requested test or tests."

Utah Code Ann. S 41-b-44.lO(a).

<..s..e..e., Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law and Order, Findings of Fact #3.)
;

Appellant's argument that a court cannot judicially determine a
question of statutory construction is fallacious.
emphatically the province of the court.

That is

Appellant has confused

the doctrine of judicial notice.
While a court may only take judicial notice of
certain types of facts, the court must judicially decide
questions of law and of statutory construction.

The court

would have been well within its bounds if it had decided an
intoxilizer is a chemical test within the meaning of Utah Cod•
Ann. S 41-6-44.10, but apparently did not.
Assuming the court below had taken judicial notice
that an intoxilizer is a chemical test under the old Rule 9 of
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:c L'i.ah Rules of Evidence,

'·"ilc

hi\ve

done so properly.

as appellant asserts, the court
Rule 9 (now Rule 201) allows a

c:,urt to take judicial notice of facts of generalized (not
;enerall knowledge "which are capable of immediate and accurate
jetermination by resort to easily accessible sources of
iridisputable accuracy."

As has already been noted, the

s:ientific world generally accepts the principles of infrared
1,olecular

absorption and spectrophotometry as accurate and

reliable means of identifying the chemical composition of
dnown compounds.

Such inf or ma ti on can be obtained from any

textbook on the subject.
The words used by the statute are "chemical test,"
not "chemical reaction."

Therefore, the court would have been

•ithin its bounds if it had decided to take judicial notice of
lhe intoxilizer as a "chemical test," or a chemical test of the
chemica1s and compounds in the blood within the purpose and
intent of the statute.
CONCLUSION
An
~eaning

intoxilizer test is a "chemical test" within the

or Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 .1 O.

'brertth test and refused.

Appellant was offered

Under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10,

rt was the duty of the Department of Public Safety, Driver
'

1

cense D1vis1on, to revoke appellant's license for one year.
The Seventh Judicial District Court, Uintah County,

State of Utah, correctly held that the only issue before it was
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whether or not appellant had refused an offered test.

Tha•

court correctly held that appellant had refused and that
license should be revoked.

hi·

Respondent respectfully request•,

that this court affirm the holding of the district court.
Respectfully submitted this
1984.

~

day of Januaty,

~~
BRUCE M.

HALE

h7_ 7;/_/'

·~·

Assistant Attorney General
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